Two men, charged with a joint violation of law, are held separately by the police. Each is told that (1) if one confesses and the other does not, the former will be given a reward of one unit and the latter will be fined two units, (2) if both confess, each will be fined one unit. At the same time each has good reason to believe that (3) if neither confesses, both will go clear.
This situation gives rise to a simple symmetric two-person game (not zero-sum) with the following table of payoffs, in which each ordered pair represents the payoffs to I and II, in that order: II confess not confess confess (-1,-1) (1,-2) not confess (-2, 1) (0, 0)
Clearly, for each man the pure strategy "confess" dominates the pure strategy "not confess." Hence, there is a unique equilibrium point* given by the two pure strategies "confess." In contrast with this non-cooperative solution one sees that both men would profit if they could form a coalition binding each other to "not confess."
The game becomes zero-sum three-person by introducing the State as a third player. The State exercises no choice (that is, has a single pure strategy) but receives payoffs as follows: In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and founded the theory of games as a branch of mathematics. Von Neumann's celebrated minimax theorem stated that every finite two-person zero-sum game has an equilibrium outcome in mixed strategies. By 1950, John Nash, then a Ph.D. student under Tucker, had generalized this result to prove that finite two-person non-zero-sum-games also have equilibria. However, it was clear that the equilibria of non-zero-sum games could have a number of strange and undesirable properties. The payoff matrix in the note was one of a number of examples devised by Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood at the RAND Corporation to exhibit some of these strange properties. Tucker recalls that he first saw the matrix in Dresher's office on a visit to RAND in 1950. Somewhat later, Tucker was asked by the psychology department at Stanford to give a talk on game theory. He thought that this example would be an interesting illustration of the difficulty of analyzing non-zero-sum games, but that it should be presented with a "story" to accompany it. The famous story of the note is the result.
As the prisoner's dilemma was popularized among social scientists by Howard Raiffa, Duncan Luce, and Anatol Rapoport in the 1950's and early 1960's, it became apparent that Dresher and Flood's simple game was a useful model for a large number of social situations. Must an invisible hand govern economics in such a way that individually rational behavior always leads to a socially optimal outcome? Not always, and the prisoner's dilemma illustrates why not. For two nations engaged in an arms race, the payoffs for the strategies "continue to arm" and "disarm" may look like those of the prisoner's dilemma, and arms races persist. A prisoner's dilemma game with a larger number of players lies at the heart of Garrett Hardin's influential 1968 essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," which shows how environmental pollution and over-exploitation of resources can be dominant strategies that lead to disastrous social outcomes.
The prisoner's dilemma game became a useful experimental tool for psychologists interested in attributes that govern human behavior in social situations. Experimental literature on the prisoner's dilemma grew steadily throughout the 1960's: Rapoport estimates that 200 experiments related to it were reported between 1965 and 1971. The game has been at least as fruitful for theoreticians. Any modern discussion of the meaning of rationality in social behavior must come to terms with the prisoner's dilemma.
What kinds of mathematical ideas can be most productive to social science? A simple idea may be best. Mathematical thinking, for instance concentrating on properties of equilibria in non-zero-sum games, can pare away inessentials and reveal a core common to many social situations. It can provide a simple model embodying that core, perhaps even a model around which experimental work can be done. It helps if the model comes with a clever story and an attractive title. The prisoner's dilemma was born in mathematical analysis, and proved so useful that it has become part of the conceptual framework of the social sciences.
We are grateful to Professor Tucker for his permission to publish "A Two-Person Dilemma," to William Lucas for keeping a mimeograph copy of the note in circulation, and to Tucker and Merrill Flood for their accounts of the events of 1950.
* Originally published as "The Prisoner's Dilemma" in the UMAP Journal. Reprinted with permission.
The Tucker Tableau
Consider the following display, where the symbols inside the box represent numerical data as they might stand in an economic table, and those outside the box represent algebraic quantities: 
Tucker's Cubical Lemma
Is it possible to arrange playing cards in a square so that no two cards of the same color are adjacent to each other-vertically, horizontally or diagonally-unless they are of the same suit, and so that on the outside rows each pair of opposite cards is of the same color but of different suits?
The answer is No. This is the 2-dimensional case of Tucker's Lemma, in disguise. Let each heart card be represented by 1, each diamond by -1, each spade by 2 and each club by -2. Then the situation described is illustrated by the figure below. Tucker's Lemma says that there must be two numbers on the same little square which sum to 0. Such a pair is underlined in the figure.
The reader can now figure out what Tucker's Lemma says in the n-dimensional case.
Despite the whimsical setting, this Lemma can be used to prove several of the deep existence theorems of topology about mappings of antipodal points, such as the Borsuk-Ulam theorem and the Lusternick-Schnirelmann theorem. These consequences, and many others, as well as the cubical lemma itself, all appear together in a review paper given by Tucker at the first meeting in 1945 of the Canadian Mathematical Congress [2] . Here in detail is another of those consequences from that paper, a covering theorem due to Tucker himself.
The Four-Set Covering Theorem. If the surface of a sphere is covered by four closed sets, no one of which contains a pair of antipodal points, then (a) any three of the sets contain a point whose antipode belongs to the fourth set, and (b) any two of the sets contain a point whose antipode belongs to the other two sets.
